Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis by Michael S. Trench

Author:Michael S. Trench
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2014-07-29T16:00:00+00:00

Second Bull Run And Antietam

Halleck's first assignment from Lincoln was to visit McClellan on the Peninsula. He went with Quartermaster General Meigs to get a first-hand look at the situation and condition of the Army and McClellan. He recommended to Lincoln that McClellan's Army be recalled. Lincoln agreed, and McClellan was ordered back to Washington.

Between Halleck's arrival in July and mid-September, Lincoln once again discontinued direct correspondence with his field commanders. There is considerable correspondence between Halleck, McClellan, and Pope during this period. Lincoln appeared to be trying to remove himself from the high degree of involvement he had exercised earlier. He began more frequent communication, mainly to McClellan, after Pope's defeat at Second Bull Run.

As discussed earlier, Lee began his advance into Maryland in August 1862. McClellan was still on the Peninsula, withdrawing his troops as slowly as he did most everything else. Facing Lee was General Pope, who was in command of all forces in northern Virginia. Pope had moved south, not expecting to meet a force as large as the Confederates had. Halleck was extremely concerned; the two Union armies were separated with an enemy force between them. He cautioned Pope against exposing himself to disaster and warned him that Lee might try to turn his right flank{132}. This was exactly what happened however, and Pope was soundly defeated by Lee on 29–30 August at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Halleck wired McClellan on 31 August, asking him to come to Washington to help him, declaring he was "utterly tired out."{133}

Lincoln's concern was growing also. He had not been in direct contact with his field commanders concerning operations until 21 August. After this date, he began telegraphing both Generals Burnside and McClellan for information from the front. While his confidence in Halleck was not strong enough that he would remain completely out of military operations, he twice referred McClellan to Halleck when he wrote with suggestions. On 29 August, Lincoln told McClellan that he agreed with a suggestion to concentrate forces to restore Pope's communications, but he left those decisions to General Halleck. One week later, he again responded to recommendations from McClellan by repeating that "General Halleck must control these questions."{134}

Lincoln was clearly trying to force all correspondence from the field through Halleck; but at the same time was demonstrating a lack of confidence in him by directly contacting those same field commanders. This was a problem that would remain throughout the campaign. Lincoln was also clearly concerned for the safety of Washington. On 3 September, four days after Pope's defeat, he ordered Halleck to immediately organize an Army for field operations, but again stressed this was to be independent of forces required for the defense of Washington.

Fearing for the safety of Washington, Lincoln placed McClellan in command of the troops in and around Washington within days of Pope's defeat. The troops around the Capitol were demoralized and badly in need of organization and discipline. Although McClellan was a poor field commander, there were few generals who could match his skill at organizing an army and preparing it to fight.

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